Department of Philosophy
The University of Texas at Austin
Recently, a number of metaphysicians have suggested that the notion of metaphysical ground is indispensable to successfully developing physicalism in the philosophy mind. While the suggestion is rarely articulated, there are reasons to think that a version of physicalism that appeals to grounding (“Grounding Physicalism”) is superior to the traditional options. On the one hand, Grounding Physicalism appears to be less demanding than standard reductive versions of physicalism, because it does not require that mental phenomena be identified with (or defined in terms of) physical or functional phenomena. On the other hand, unlike certain versions of non-reductive physicalism, it purports to adequately capture the idea that the mental depends on (and is explained by) the physical. Despite its initial appeal, I argue that a new spin on a common objection to physicalism—that it leaves an “explanatory gap”—undermines the enthusiasm for Grounding Physicalism. The explanatory gap problem has been heavily discussed, but usually with the assumption that physicalism is an identity thesis. By contrast, I focus on Grounding Physicalism and argue that it leaves an explanatory gap—moreover, one that cannot be addressed in the usual way. I then argue that this creates a dilemma for the Grounding Physicalist.
The phenomenal concept strategy for defending physicalism against the knowledge argument is to substitute a dualism of concepts for a dualism of properties. The idea is that when Mary sees a red object for the first time, she acquires a phenomenal concept for the experience of red. But what is a phenomenal concept? To answer this question, Balog, Block, and Papineau have independently developed a quotational-indexical account according to which phenomenal concepts are partly constituted by phenomenal experiences. However, Michael Tye has argued against the phenomenal concept strategy, and it is unclear whether the quotational-indexical account can overcome his objections. I will suggest that the quotational-indexical account can handle Tye’s objections by making a crucial concession. I then argue that once this concession is made, the account can no longer address the knowledge argument. I conclude that if the phenomenal concept strategy depends on the quotational-indexical account, then it fails.
Many philosophers working in metaethics accept what I call the Relational View (RV). According to RV, the predicates "is a reason for" and "counts in favor of" express a relation—the favoring-relation—that holds of considerations and responses. But it has gone unacknowledged that RV gives rise to a number of puzzles. The puzzles can be summarized with a single question: What, exactly, is favored in a favoring-relation? The answer may seem obvious: a response. But a momen's reflection shows that this answer is unsatisfying. For when agents respond to their reasons, they perform actions, concrete particulars, whereas before they act, no such particulars exist. This might prompt us to say that acting in a way is favored, yet this suggestion does little to clarify the relationship between what agents have reason to do (act in a way) and what they in fact do (perform actions). I develop the puzzles in detail and propose a common solution.
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